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In this study, 10日apanese students received the three kinds of offers: favorable tm"nequaL
u晶IVOrable and unequal, and equal o範rs which were made by either the other paniclpant Or a COmputer
roulette･ They perceived the unfavorable unequal offer as the most unfair and'reJeCted it most among the
o範rs, suggestlng that their reactions were determined by both self-interest and fairness concerns･ The
observed diHerence between acceptance of intentional and random offers suggested dlat the fairness
judgment was made based on evJuation of outcome and that of procedme･
Key wordS'tJtimatum barga.nLng, PrOCeduaL rairness, distributive fairness
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Negotiation researchers have generally assumed that paniclpantS in negotiation are rational,
that is㍉hey are prlmarily motivated by their sellinterest and try to choose the best altemative to
maximize it (e.g., Dixit 皮 Nelebu鯖, 1991)･ However言his sellinterest assumption has been
questioned by a number of emplrlCal mdings, which are typlCally fbund in experimental studies
using a ultimatum bargaining game(G叫Schmittberger膏Schwarze, 1982; Kahnemann,
Knetsch, Thaler, 1986; Straub & Muminghan, 1995)･ In this game, an allotment of money is
granted to be divided between two parties if certain conditions are met･ One of the parties･ ofEerer･
lS glVen the total allotment initially and is then expected to o鵬r the other pa叫a pOnion of the
allotment･ If the other pany占eSpOndent, accepts the o鵬r, both panies obtain the entire
dlotment divided between them based on the terms of the o鵬r･ But if the other pany reJects the
o輝neither of them obtains any of the allotment･ Since respondents in this situation are able to
galれ PrO飢only when they accept o胱rs㍉he se皿nterest assumption predicts that respondents will
accept o範rs no matter how unequal they are〟 However, emplrlCal research has demonstrated that
respondents very frequently reject unequal offers (e･g･, Gtith et al･, 1982)i
A convincing interpretation has been fb-arded in several studies (e･gつMumighan 氏
pillu叫1995; Thaler, 1988) that respondents perceive unequal o鵬rs as un紳r･ It is based on the
assumption held by justice researchers that people evaluate or respond to bargalnlng Situation
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such as distributi｡11 0f resources and their consequences in terms of fairlleSS (e･g･, Tyler,
B.C.kmann, Smith a duo, 1 997). When respondents perceive unequal oHers as unfair, they are
m.tivated to restore faimess. Rejection ot'an unequal offer means no prof.t for both parties･ but
it makes the situation even for both parties･ Therefore, lt is reasonable to interpret reJeCtion of
unequal offers by respondents as motivated hy a concem for faimess･ Researchers have
distinguished procedural and distributive faimess (Lind a Tyler, 1988; Thibaut a Walker･ 1975)I
H｡W｡ver恒Iere are nO Studies cla璃Ting how inHuential these two types of faimess judgments are
in respondents十eactioIIS tO the ultimatum hargalnlng Sltuations･ The purpose of the present study
was to examine this issue.
why do respondents perceive unequal offers as unfair even though allocators are orlglnally
acknowledged heedom to allocate money? Justice researchers have fbund that people judge
fairness in a bargaining situation in both its procedure and outcome (Lind a TyTer, 1988'･ Thibaut
氏 walker, 1975). Regarding outcome, people judge it unfair if itJdoes not meet what they believe
they deserve (Adams, 1965; Lemer, 1981)･ In ultimatum bargaining situations･ money is allotted
to both parties independently of their contribution･ So they may feel equally entided to the
resources i.e., each of them deseⅣes half of the amount･ Therefbre, respondents may perceive
unequal o鵬rs as unfair･
From the procedural perspective, respondents sometimes perceive that o的rers are not
neutral･ When respondents perceive that the allocation process is biased hy o鵬rers 'selrinterest,
they may judge the o触s un蘭independently of unequalness of the o紺S･ Changlllg the
procedmes of the bargaining so that o航s were randomly made by a computer, Blount (1995)
found that respondents accepted unequal offers more frequently than when particIPantS made the
o舶rs. In the random allocation every paniclpant is given an equal chance to get a large amount
of resources･ Hence, unequal offers may be perceived as fair based on the procedure･
In Kramer, Shar and Woerner'S (1995) study on the e胱cts of the o胱rers当ntentions on
respondents, reactions, paniclpantS received nnal o鵬rs which were made by adding an extra
amount of money to what o胱rers initially proposed i The extra amount was randomy decided
within a rang誼om -loo‰ to + loo‰ ･ Subjects十eactions to the o触were determined by the
o鵬rers当nitial o胱rs more than by the mat o的rs言hat is, they reJeCted the統al equal o鵬rs if
the initial o胱rs were unequally small and accepted the ma霊 unequally smau o鵬rs if the initial
o的rs were equal･ This mding suggests that respondents were in皿enced by their ascrlptlOnS Of the
o鮎rers当nitial intentions rather than the equality of the outcome･
Bas｡d on the above discussion, We predicted that respondents judge紳rness of o縦rs in
Jtimatum bargalnlng ln terms Of both outcome and procedure･ Randomly made unequal o鵬rs
may be seen by respondents as unfair in a distributive sense but fair in a procedural sense7 While
intentional unequal offers by offerers are regarded as unfair in both distributive and procedural
senses･ Therefbre, We predicted that both intentional and random unequal o範rs would be rated
by respondents as unfair (Hypothesis 1), but that intentional unequal offers will be rated as even
m..e unfair than random unequal offers (FIypothesis 2)I Furthermore, respondents will reject
intentional unequal offers more frequently than random unequal offers (Hypothesis 3) I
Early Justice researchers postulated that the perceptlOnS Of細mess were not inmenced by
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favorability of outcomes (Adams, 1965), but empirical I.ndings show that people pemeive
fav.rahle outcomes as more fair than unfavorable ones (Diekmann, Samuels, Boss, a Bazeman,
1997). Therefbre, We predicted that respondents would rate hvorable unequal o触rs as higher in
distributive faimess than unfavorable unequal ones (Hypothesis 4)･ Walker. LaTour, Lind a
Thibaut (1974) found that people perceive procedures used to resolve conHicts as more fair when
they obtained favorable outcomes･ Therefore･ We predicted that respondents would rate favorable
unequal offers as higher in pr6cedural fairness than unfavorable unequal offers (IIypothesis 5)･
Based on the assumption that請mess judgment inHuences reactions to o鵬r串Ilally, We predicted
that respondents would accept t･avorable unequal offers more frequently than unfavorable unequal
ones (Hypothesis 6) I
Method
PartlCIPantS･　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　,
A hundred and one Japanese university students (42 men and 59 women) pa高cipated in the
scenario study as one of their requirements in an introductoIY psychology comse･
Procedures.
The design of the study contained two between-participant Variables: intentionality of o胱r
(intentional or random) and offer sizes (favorable unequal, equal, or unfavorable unequal)I We
randomly asslgned the palticIPantS into one of the six conditions･ and gave them a packet
consisting Of 3 pages･ On the lst page we instructed each panicIPant tO assume that he or she were
negotiating With another student, with whom he or she was not acquainted, to allocate a cenain
amount of money between them･ We emphasized that only when they reached an agreement ill
this ultimatum bargalnlng both of them co血d obtain pro範･ On the 2nd page, we explained the
山es. The total amount of money allotted was 2,000 Japanese Yen (approximately 1 6 US dollars)･
In the intentional o範r scenario, we told the pa高cIPantS that the one of the paniclpantS Was the
o鵬rer, who was able to仕eely divide the money however he or she liked and would make an o胱r
to the other paniclpan申he respondent･ In the random o胱r scenario, we also told the paniclpantS
that one of them was an o鵬rer, but the amount o鵬red was randomly decided占hat is, the o範rer
must divide the money according to the res山of computer roJette･ In both scenarios, all the
panicIPantS Were assigned the respondent roleぅand誰e to either accept or reIect the o鮎r･ If they
accepted互both of the players would obtain the accorded allotment, but if they reJeCted it･ neither
of them wo血d obtain anything･
on the 3rd page, we int'ormed the partir,lPantS that the offer was either 200 Yen･ 1 ･000 Yen･
or 1,800 Yen, and told them that they had a choice of acceptlng Or reJeCtlng the o鵬r･ We
attempted to measure the perceived請mess of the o触In order to measure perceived
distributive faimess, we asked the particIPaTTtS tO judge how fair the offer itself was by ratmg on
a 7-Point scale ranging from Not at all (1) to Absolutely fa･'r (7)I To measure perceived
procedural faimess, we asked them to judge how neutral the ofrerer was in the oEJer made by
rating on a 7-point scale ranging五〇m胸at all (1 ) to Absoluteb′ neutral (7)i
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Results
we analyzed the perceived distributive細rness of o胱rs by ANOVA uslng lntentionality of
o鵬rs and the o鵬r size as independent variables･ All the e胱cts were s即incant‥ intentionality･
F(1, 95) - ll.08,p < ･01i offer size, F(2, 95) - 84･82,p < ･01i and the interaction,
F(2, 95) - 8.86, p <.01. F互re 1 shows that the panicipants rated the 1,000 Yen o舶r as
higher in distributive fairness (M - 6･25) than the other offers ¢ < ･01), with no signif.cant
difference between the 200 Yen offer (M - 2.32) and the 1800 Yen offer (M - 2･16)･ The effect
of intentionality was signir.cant only for the 200 Yen offer, F (1, 99) - 37･63, p < ･01'the
pa五clpantS rated this o舶r as higher in disthbutive faimess when it was made by a roulette than
when it was made by the other particlpant･
200　　　　1 ,000　　　　1 ,800
0日er Size Propohionate to 2,000 Yen AIiotment
Figue 1 〟 Disuibutive蘭mess of o胱r･
In ANOVA of perceived procedural faimess the main effect of offer size was signiIICant, F (2, 95)
- 10.41,p <.01, but its sign誼cant interaction with intentionality, F(2, 95) 10･09,p < ･01,
means that the effect of offer size on the perceived neutrality was significant only in the intentional
o鵬r scenario, F (2,98)-21.39, p< ･01, but not in the roulette o胱r scenario, F (2, 98) < 1･
Fi糾re 2 shows that the paniclpantS rated the method of aⅡocation as less neutral when the o鮎rer
made the 200 Yen o胱r than when he o鵬rer made either the 1000 Yen or 1800 Yen o鵬rs b
<.01), With no signiflCant difference between the latter two offers･ Further, the participants rated
the o胱rer who intentionally made the 200 Yen o批r as less neutral than those who made the 200
Yen o鵬r based on the roJette b < ･01)i
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200　　　　1 ,000　　　　1 ,800
0廿er Size Propo砧onate to 2,000 Yen AIiotment
Figue 2･ Perceived procedmal fairness of offerer.
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In the loglinear analysis of response category (acceptance or rejection) Ⅹ intentionality x o鵬r









0日er Size Propohionate to 2,000 Yen Aiiotment
Fi糾re 3･ Percent of respondents who accepted o胱r･
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it means that the panicipants accepted the 200 Yen o範r (55･3%) lessがequently than either
L000 Yen (97･1 %) or L800 Yen o胱rs (78･6%)i Although parameters of response category 汰
o胱r size x intentionality were not slgn誼ca叫we examined d雌rences in acceptance of each of
three o的rs between the intentional and roulette scenarios by the Chi square test in order to test
FIypothesis 3 regarding the effect of intentionality on acceptance･ It was round that the
participants in the roulette condition accepted the 200 Yen offer more frequently than those in the
intentional condition, Chisquare (1) - 5･21, p < ･05･
Discussion
ln the present study, We attempted to determine whether reactioIIS tO the ultimatum
bargammg s.tuation were determined by concems of self-interest or by concems of faimess･ The
particIPantS rated unequal offers as more unfair than equal offer, but they accepted the unequally
large o胱r (1,800 Yen o舶r) more血equently than the unequally smaH o舶r (200 Yen o舶r), as we
predicted in靭othesis 6･ These results suggest that acceptance of o鵬rs were more inHuenced by
selrinterest concems･ If acceptance was detemined only by selrinterest, however, the
particIPantS Should have most Frequently accepted the 1,800 Yen ofrer･ This conclusion, however,
does not accord with theぬct that the actual percentage of acceptance of the 1,800 Yen o能r did
not slgn誼cantly d胱r血om that of the 1,000 Yen o舶r, though it might have been caused by
ceiling e鵬ct･
As we predicted in Hypothesis 3, the particJPantS accepted the 200 Yen offer made hy
roulette more l･equently than that made hy the other person･ This cannot be explained as a
semnterest concem･ On the contraIY, these mdings suggest that acceptancelreJeCtion of o的rs
was inHuenced by a fairness concern because the pa.ticIPantS Perceived the intentional 200 Yell
o胱r as more un繍r than the random 200 Yen o舶r. Research with westem particIPantS has
demonstrated that respondents'acceptancelreleCtion of o鵬rs in the ultimatum bargalnlng
situation is jointly determined by鮒mess and se皿interest concems (C証h et all, 1982;
Thompkinson & Bethwaite, 1995)〟 The present results illdicate that this is also true of Japanese
panlClpantS 〟
We attempted to distinguish percept10n Of procedural fairness and of distributive faimess hy
uslng two d確rent methods of allotments･ The random 200 Yen o胱r was rated by the
paniclpantS aS mOre触r than the intentional 200 Yen o的r on both procedural and distributive
scales, consistent with匂pothesis 2 but inconsistent with匂pothesis l･ A possible interpretation
for the latter is that the particIPantS might have strongly expected an equal offer in the intentional
scenario simply because the o胱rer had the authorlty tO decide the amount to o鵬r, and the
perceived discrepancy between expected o舶r and actual one might have caused the perceptlOn
of unfairness in the intentional 200 Yen orfer･ In contrast, the particIPantS in the roulette scenario
might have had lower expectations in a game of chance decided by an wholly neutral and
disinterested party which言n this case, was a computer making random choices･ D鵬rent
expectations appear to be made based on d鵬rent procedures of making o鵬rs between the two
corlditions･ Therefbre, We concluded that acceptlng Or reJeCtion of o鵬rs was determined by
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perceived procedural faimess･
By uslng two kinds of Fairness scales, further, we examined whether a concem for self-interest
biased perception of faimess or not･ The bias was found only in procedural faimess (consistent
with Hypothesis 5), but not in distributive raimess (inconsistent with HJPOthesis 4)･ The flnding
that the panicIPantS rated unequal o舶rs as un繍r in a distributive sense占egardless of whether
the offers were favorable or not for them, was consistent with early equlty research findings
(Gergen, Morse, 皮 Bode, 1974; Gr6enberg, 1988) that people do not feel comfortable with
overpayment･ The question is, why did the paniclpantS regard the procedure fbr the 1,800 Yen
o鵬r as more equitable than that fbr the 200 Yen o舶r? Respondents have no control over the
decision of offers in the ultimatum bargammg sltuation, and so they are not responsible for it even
if inequality happens･ Seeing the unequally large o鵬r in the roJette scenario as being made by
chance and that in the intentional scneario as being voluntarily chosen by o胱re㌦ the pa高clpantS
might have feel that the offer was Justified from the procedural perspective･
ノ
Conclusions and Implications
ln the present study, we examined behavioral col-coms OIl reaCtioIIS tO O範rs in me
ultimatum bargalnlng game･ By examining d胱rences in acceptancelrejection of intentiollal alld
random o鵬rs, the study demonstrated that reactions to unequal o範rs were detemined by
concem for faimess among Japanese participants, as was found among western partic,ipants (Ctith
et a1., 1982; Thaler, 1989). Though not perfectly consistent with ou predictions, the results of this
study suggest that respondents made judgmerltS based or- distributive and procedllral蘭mess･ It
is noted that acceptance/rejection was more clearly associated with perceived procedural fairness
than with perceived distributive faimess･ For example, the pa.tic.pants reJeCted the 200 Yen offer
more frequently than 1,800 Yen off'er and they rated the fo-er as more unfair in a procedural
sense than the latter, but their ratings of distributive請rness did not signmcantly d鵬r (see Figure
1 and 2). This implies that respondents in the ultimatum bargaining situations are more concemed
with faimess of the procedures for making an offer than fairness of the offer itself･
We recogn.ze that there are at least two different factors involved in ultimatum hargammg
which determine perceptlOn Of procedural飴-imess･ One is neutrality of o鵬rer, which we
examined in the present study, that is, Fair treatment in allocation･ The other is fairness in role
ass.gnment of offerer and respondent between particIPantS･ People perceive that offerers have
more control over outcomes than respolldelltS do ill the ultimatum bargalnlng Situations
(Murnighan 莱 Pillutla, 1 995)･ The experimenter decided the role assigTlment in the present Study･
The particIPantS might have seen it as unfair and their reeling of unfaimess might have affected
their acceptance or reJection of the offer･ Future research must cxqmine this issue･
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